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Aiming for Certainty:  The Kanun, Blood Feuds and the Ascertainment of Customary Law  
 
Abstract 
Customary law is an alternative legal framework to statute or public law. In the past the 
existence of customary law was viewed as problematic due to the uncertainty which 
accompanies legal pluralism.  Increasingly, scholars are recognizing legal pluralism as simply a 
reality to be negotiated, rather than a problem.  One frequently proposed solution to the 
difficulties posed by the existence of customary law is to write it down, or ascertain it, in order 
to provide for legal certainty.  This article addresses this goal in three parts.  The first part 
describes customary law and how it functions in its uncodified form in post-colonial settings, 
specifically in Sub-Saharan Africa and parts of Asia.  The second part of the article details the 
reasons why scholars and public officials have often suggested writing customary law down as 
a solution and situates these arguments within the contemporary debate on legal pluralism.   In 
the third section a specific case of written customary law, the Albanian Kanun of Lekё 
Dukagjini, is analyzed with a focus on its modern usage in a post-socialist context.  The paper 
concludes noting that ascertainment does not bring legal certainty to customary law in the ways 
that are anticipated.  Writing down an oral tradition or a practice may produce a document for 
reference, but this does not limit its use nor necessarily increase the predictability of its 
application.  The article also emphasizes the role of customary law in defining group identity in 
post-socialist settings.    
 
  Keywords: customary law; Kosovo; Albania; legal pluralism; codification; post-communism 
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Aiming for Certainty:  The Kanun, Blood Feuds and the Ascertainment of Customary Law 
All countries around the world have social norms beyond public law that regulate behavior and 
structure the decisions of individuals within a society.  Indeed, legal pluralism, broadly defined 
as the existence of multiple sets of rules and norms, is increasingly understood as ordinary and 
normal.  In many countries, traditions are so weighty as to fall into a category that we can refer 
to as customary law.  As with most norms, customary law is infrequently written down, it 
simply exists and everyone knows, or believes they know, what it entails.  Where customary 
law comes to the attention of politicians and policy-makers, it is typically because it provides 
alternative guidance to statute law or contradicts human rights norms.   
Customary law in post-colonial countries is a body of rules governing personal status, 
communal resources and local organization.  It can determine access to land and water, the pool 
of eligible marriage partners a person might have, and what a child or a spouse inherits.  It is, 
therefore, of both social and economic importance.  Customary law can be conceived of as a 
very strong social norm, while it is possible to break that norm, the consequences, both social 
and economic, are so high as to prevent noncompliance.  Some examples will help illustrate the 
point.  In a famous Kenyan legal case, the government upheld a family’s customary right to 
bury their son in a place that neither he, nor his wife, desired that he be buried (Stamp 1991).    
In Tanzania,  a man, frustrated with a court’s attempt to invalidate the marriage he set up for 
his unwilling daughter, declared that she was now the responsibility of the government and it 
was the government’s obligation to find her a husband (Hodgson 2001).  In these cases, which 
came to light when the actions taken under customary law were challenged in court, we can see 
the strong bonds of customary practices in establishing the boundaries of the community and 
regulating behavior within it.  The fact that in both these cases customary law was contested in 
court indicates some of the problems that exist in legally pluralistic societies.1  Which laws 
apply and when?  Who gets to decide when customary law is respected and when public law 
takes precedence?  These issues must be dealt with somehow in every legally pluralistic society.  
One of the frequently proposed solutions to the uncertainties posed by legal pluralism is the 
ascertainment of customary law.  Writing the law down allows for the recognition of customary 
law as a source of norms, but also provides for the legal certainty necessary in public law.   
This article has two specific goals.  First, it seeks to interrogate the proposal that ascertainment 
is a necessary step in addressing legal pluralism.  This is done through the examination of a case 
                                                     
1 Legally pluralistic societies are typically characterized by the presence of both customary and statute or 
public law.  However, an additional layer of complexity can be added by religious law in places like 
Nigeria or Indonesia where sharia law, customary law and public law are all present and sometimes 
promote competing norms of behavior.  This availability can lead to ‘forum shopping’ in which people 
with a conflict choose the law and dispute resolution mechanism which they feel best represents their 
interests (Benda-Beckmann 1981). 
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in which customary law has been written and assessing whether its existence in written form 
led to the expected benefits.  Second, the article seeks to contribute to the relatively sparse 
literature on customary law in post-socialist settings. While there are ample studies of the role 
and use of customary law in post-colonial settings, far less is known about the functioning and 
use of customary law in Europe after socialism.  These goals will be addressed in the following 
manner.  The first part of this article describes the nature of customary law and how it functions 
in its uncodified form, the second section details the reasons why scholars and public officials 
have often suggested writing, or ascertaining, customary law as a solution.  The third section 
focuses on a specific case of written customary law, the Albanian Kanun of Lekё Dukagjini.  The 
final section of the paper is a reflection on the role of customary law in modern states.    
 
Customary Law 
Much of what we know about customary law comes from the study of post-colonial societies in 
which customary law was allowed to exist side by side with public law.  Indeed, customary law 
in colonial regimes was typically used as a tool of administering indigenous populations and 
was encouraged, transformed and sometimes even constructed in ways to assist with 
domination and rule (Chanock 1991, 1998; Joireman 2011; Mamdani 1996; Snyder 1987).  
Gordon Woodman notes that classic discussions of legal pluralism, which always conceived of 
it as problematic, were set in a post-colonial context (Woodman 2012).  In the ‘new’ legal 
pluralism the context has shifted and we recognize legal pluralism in diverse contexts such as 
post-socialist states as well as the US and Western Europe.  The shifting of contexts allows for 
the consideration of customary law in a new light.   
 
The use of customary law in colonial settings is distinct from customary law in socialist settings.  
In socialist countries customary norms were allowed to continue insofar as they did not 
interfere with public law, but were not encouraged and did not share the same administrative 
purpose.  This is an important caveat to remember when examining the literature on customary 
law.  To be explicit, customary law in countries in Sub-Saharan Africa thrived under colonization 
because it controlled access to important resources such as land, timber, water and labor.  It also 
had its own legally recognized leaders and adjudicators who controlled populations and 
resources with the consent of the colonial state.  In many countries there were parallel court 
systems for customary cases or assessors whose role it was to bring a traditional perspective 
into the government courts.  The use of customary law under colonial regimes gave it a power 
that endured into the post-colonial era.   
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Customary law in socialist states played a different role.  From the contemporary cases of 
customary law in the post-Soviet Central Asian states (Edgar 2004; Ross 1999), to the case 
considered here, customary law survived the socialist era and efforts of states to supplant its use 
in both family life and the control of resources.  Yet, in both post-colonial and post-socialist 
settings, customary law clearly plays a role in group identity.  
 
In both colonial and post-colonial settings, customary law controlled both people and resources.  
"A customary law may be defined as a normative order observed by a population, having been 
formed by regular social behavior and the development of an accompanying sense of 
obligation" (Woodman 2011: 10).  This definition embeds customary law in its relational and 
behavioral contexts.  Customary law is typically uncodified, not existing at all in written form, 
or incompletely systemized, thereby enabling dynamism in its application.  Customary law can 
shift and change as circumstances demand and adapt to specific contexts (Sage and Woolcock 
2012).  In a 2002 interview, a senior chief in Kenya recognized that customary law is created and 
molded by traditional leaders, saying, “Customary law is what I describe” (Human Rights 
Watch 2003:11).  His statement captures both the potential for interpretation that exists and the 
role that the community and its leaders play in defining what is customary. 
   
Customary law is not unique in its adaptive and dynamic qualities.  Most legal systems allow 
for flexibility and have some ability to accommodate change.  Indeed, one of the qualities of 
common law systems that is lauded as a great strength is its adaptability to changing 
circumstances (Eisenberg 1988; Hayek 1973; Joireman 2006; Morriss and Meiners 2000; Rubin 
and Bailey 1994).  Because the common law relies on case law and precedent, it can evolve over 
time in response to contextual changes.  Slow evolution over a period of time is a positive 
quality in a legal system.  Unpredictability is not.  A lack of consistent and predictable 
application of legal rules, be they customary or public, impedes the functioning of a vibrant 
economic system and negatively impacts the ability of people to plan for the future.   
The issue of predictability touches on the current debate over whether legal pluralism is a 
problem or simply a reality.  There is a school of thought which argues that legal hybridity is so 
pervasive that it is impossible to eliminate it.  Therefore, the challenge is to develop 
mechanisms to accommodate it (Berman 2012).  While others have defined the contours of that 
debate (Twining 2012), it is worth noting that the arguments about ascertainment do not align 
exclusively with one camp or the other, at least if we understand ascertainment in its most 
narrow context, as a written recording of customary law.  In this article, when I discuss 
ascertainment, I am referring to writing it down and giving it a coherent form.  I do not use the 
broader and more politically charged term of codification - adopting customary law into the 
public law through legislative action.  This is an important distinction to make.  Ascertainment 
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could help us to understand customary law better; it could also assist with specifying the exact 
points of conflict with public law.  Since ascertainment is only a step towards legal uniformity if 
it results in formalized law, this discussion is separate from the current debate regarding 
whether legal pluralism is a problem that needs to be solved.2            
In the realm of legal theory there is broad agreement regarding the interaction of social norms 
and public law.  Norms may suffice for small communities, families and those with face-to-face 
contact, but larger networks of interaction require more formalized mechanisms to mold and 
constrain behavior (Weber 1968).  H.L.A. Hart argued that primary rules, those that govern 
conduct, will suffice for interactions between family members and kin groups.  However, he 
posits that secondary rules governing contracts, including rules of definition and adjudication, 
are necessary to deal with uncertainty and inefficiency as an economy expands (Hart 1997). 
Whether it matters if norms persist alongside public laws (legal pluralism) was not a question 
Hart considered, but it is an extremely pertinent question in many societies today that have 
customary law.   
Every society has multiple normative orders as there are a plethora of social rules, religious law, 
and conventional practices in addition to public law.  What is unique in the case of customary 
law is that it is an alternate forum to state legal rules and often overlaps with or opposes those 
state rules.  Customary law privileges resource claims of recognized members of the group, 
which can have positive effects on individual well-being and increase the benefits of group 
membership.  There is also an immediacy to customary law that is valued by those in 
communities in which it functions (Oomen 2005). 
Yet, the existence of a state legal system alongside a customary legal system and the dynamic 
nature of customary law can create problems in description and analysis.  Indeed, legal scholars 
have struggled with even the use of terms to define customary law in its variety of forms and 
usages.  Living customary law is different from codified, judicial and textbook customary law.3  
                                                     
2 So for example, Namibia had an ‘ascertainment’ process in which customary law was recorded, but not 
established as public law.  It was then not a problem if the customary law contravened the constitution as 
the written customary law was not a formalized part of the Namibian legal system.  
3 In wrestling with its different usages, Ubink and Van Rooij come up with the following distinctions.  
"Codified customary law refers to legislation codifying the customary law of a certain jurisdiction.  This 
provides legal certainty and accessibility to the customary law, while at the same time unifying, 
simplifying and crystallizing it, often in a formal language that is different from that used in the original 
community.  Judicial customary law refers to the norms developed by judges when applying customary 
norms in courts and as laid down in national law reports.  Here also, customary law is made more certain 
and accessible, but at the same time can be crystallized, unified and formalized.  Textbook customary law 
refers to authoritative texts written by state administrators or anthropologists, often used by state courts 
or administrators when trying to ascertain appropriate customary norms.  It offers a non-legal and more 
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Yet, there is an inconsistent use of terms across contexts.  Definitional struggles with the 
specifics of customary law and a desire to recognize it somehow in public policy have led to 
calls for it to be written down and even for its adoption into public law or codification.   
 
Ascertainment of Customary Law 
Calls for the ascertainment of customary law come most frequently from those outside a 
community or from government officials. In Sub-Saharan Africa there have been frequent 
appeals for the writing down of customary laws beginning in the colonial era up through the 
present.   
“Since the colonial period, a number of governments - often supported by 
national or international researchers- have attempted to put parts of customary 
law into writing with a dual aim: to end the uncertainty and discretion caused by 
its flexibility; and also, equally important, to come to grips with the content and 
nature of customary law for their own understanding”   (Ubink 2011: 131). 
In the contemporary era, as Ghana has embarked upon a reform of their land administration 
system, there has been a call to ascertain customary law in order to increase the predictability of 
economic relationships, specifically those related to land (Ghana News Agency 2010).  In a few 
cases, such as South Africa and Namibia, ascertainment and in some areas codification has 
actually occurred and in South Sudan efforts at ascertainment of customary law with an eye to 
integrating it into state law are currently underway  (Isser 2012). Whether the desire for a clear 
and written customary law comes from outsiders, as in the colonial era, or from within a 
community, there are three interrelated reasons given for the necessity of ascertaining 
customary law: consistency in application, alignment with public law and reduction of 
uncertainty in order to promote economic development.   
 
Consistency in the application of legal principles is viewed to be an important characteristic of 
any fair legal system.  Legal decisions should align with the agreed upon rights of the people 
                                                                                                                                                                           
formalistic source on the appropriate customary law.  Some of the drawbacks of textbook customary law 
are that they only exist for certain groups and therefore fail to provide as much legal certainty as nation-
wide codifications, and that they freeze the norms of the groups discussed.  Finally, living customary law 
refers to the norms that govern daily life in the community at the local level. There may be considerable 
differences between these different versions of customary law, especially between the living and written 
versions, because living customary norms are inherently dynamic." 
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within it.  Past and present decisions should be similar, all other things being equal.  
Consistency is closely related to predictability.  If law is consistently applied then people will 
know, without having to go to court to get a legal decision or seek the intervention of traditional 
leaders, what is required of them to follow the law.  The constant application of laws or norms 
is of particular importance when there are issues of equity or economic resources at stake.  If 
customary law dictates that it is never appropriate to cut down fruit trees in order to grow 
crops, then fruit trees should not be cut down.  It is a violation of the consistency of the law if 
some people are allowed to cut down fruit trees and others cannot.   
Observed customary law is inconsistent and this is one reason why there is a desire to write it 
down.  Key principles are applied differently based on circumstance, social standing, and 
interpretation of the traditional leaders involved in its application.  Inconsistency of customary 
law is particularly problematic when it pertains to resource access, such as land, forest and 
water resources.  For example, in Sub-Saharan Africa many women farming customary land 
have only secondary rights.  Some studies have argued that inheritance rights for women are 
not a problem and that women are able to negotiate customary law and maintain usufruct 
rights to land through social networking (Khadiagala 2002; Rose 2002).  If customary law was 
consistently applied, women would not be able to continue to farm land belonging to their 
husbands after those men had died.  However, recognition of their need and membership in the 
community trumps a rigid application of inheritance norms, in many cases to the advantage of 
these widows.  Inconsistent application of customary law can therefore be potentially beneficial 
as it allows for the maneuverability of the judges and the weighing of multiple social norms in 
different contexts.   
The second criticism of customary law is that it is not aligned with public law and this lack of 
coherence creates both unpredictability and the possibility of forum shopping in conflict 
resolution processes in order to get the desired outcome (Tamanaha 2012).  This is most obvious 
in cases where customary law is in direct opposition to public law.  In Kenya, for example, the 
government passed a law that all children of parents who died intestate should inherit equally, 
regardless of their gender.  Yet, even after this bill became law, in many families where a parent 
died intestate the female children were allocated a smaller share of their parent’s property than 
their male siblings.   Female children who wanted to challenge their inheritance could take their 
cases to court and have them heard according to public law.  When gaps like this one, exist 
between public law and customary law, there is greater possibility for the generation of 
litigation. 
The final criticism of customary law is that it leads to uncertainty.  One cannot be certain 
whether a particular legal principle or decision will hold, or whether it could be reinterpreted 
by someone else in a different context.  The uncertainty which can lead to litigation, or forum 
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shopping, in order to achieve clarity can also undermine economic development efforts 
(Tamanaha 2012).  If it is not clear that I will be able to farm a particular field five years from 
now, I may not want to invest in improvements to the field.  Since customary law often governs 
the allocation of community resources, such as land and water, the issue of certainty has 
economic consequences.   
In Australia, desires to recognize and apply Aboriginal customary law have foundered on this 
issue of certainty (Law Reform Commission of New South Wales 2000).  As long as the law is 
not written, it can change in ways that may not be entirely predictable.  Indeed, even after some 
customary law was ascertained it has still been subject to different interpretations by community 
members.   
Not everyone is an enthusiastic supporter of writing down customary law.  As mentioned 
earlier, some appreciate the flexibility in customary law which is enabled by its lack of 
formalized rules.  The very small number of cases in which ascertainment or codification  has 
occurred (South Africa and Namibia) have not lead to any conclusive assessments regarding an 
increase in certainty in application and use.  In Namibia an ascertainment project resulted in a 
written law of multiple indigenous groups, but these laws were not formalized by an act of 
parliament and therefore did not become part of the public law of (Hinz 2010).  In South Africa 
customary law was originally codified during the apartheid years and was used much in the 
way it was in the rest of colonial Africa – as a tool of control.  Other ascertainment and 
codification projects are underway but, on the whole, there are very few instances from which 
to judge its benefits and disadvantages.  It is thus helpful to examine other cases in which 
customary law has been formally recorded.  Albanian customary law, discussed below, is 
operative in three separate countries with Albanian populations: Albania, Kosovo and 
Macedonia.  All of these are post-socialist countries, two of which, Kosovo and Macedonia, 
were formerly part of Yugoslavia.     
 
The Kanun of Lekё Dukagjini 
Albanian customary law, the Kanun of Lekё Dukagjini (hereafter the Kanun), has been recorded 
since the early 20th century.  The basic tenets of the law are written down and are widely 
available in Albanian, English, and German.  The Kanun bears the name of an Albanian Prince 
Lekё Dukagjini (1410-1481) who fought against the Ottoman Empire and was a contemporary of 
the Albanian hero Gjergj Skanderbeg, the Dragon of Albania.  However, while there is an ample 
historic record of the exploits of Skandebeg and his military opposition to the Ottomans, far less 
is known about Dukagjini.  Both men have legal codes named after them, but scholars agree 
that neither actually authored the legal codes that bear their names (Fox 1989).  Albanian 
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folklorist, Margaret Hasluck reports that Lekё Dukagjini fought against the Ottoman empire 
and agreed to surrender only when the Turks promised to respect the Albanian law (Hasluck 
1954: 14).  This foundational myth would explain why the code bears his name.  Some have 
argued that the Kanun originated as far back as the 5th century BC (Arsovska and Craig 2006: 
224).  While not the only compilation of Albanian customary law, the Kanun of Lekё Dukagjini is 
the best known and most frequently referenced. 
The Kanun was not formalized until an Albanian Franciscan priest, Shtjefёn Gjeҫov began to 
write down the provisions of the customary law in 1913.  The priest was murdered for his pro-
Albanian political views before finishing the work and other monks completed the codification 
in 1933 and published it with Gjeҫov noted as the author (Fox 1989).  Despite the fact that most 
Albanians are now Muslims, the Kanun emphasizes the role of the Catholic Church (perhaps the 
fact that the translator was a priest had something to do with this) and has little to say about 
Islam.  Indeed, in the English translation of the text there is frequent reference to “the Faith and 
the Kanun” as if the two were operating together, yet the faith mentioned is no longer as 
common in areas where the Kanun is considered important. Some consider the Kanun to be the 
foundation of Albanian culture, whether that culture is found in Albania proper, Kosovo or 
Macedonia all of which have large Albanian populations (Arsovska 2006).  Nowhere is the 
Kanun part of the legal statutes of the state. 
The Kanun has twelve sections: Church, Family, Marriage, House, Livestock and Property, 
Work, Transfer of Property, The Spoken Word, Honor, Damages, Law Regarding Crimes, 
Judicial Law, Exemptions and Exceptions.  At the heart of the Kanun is the idea of honor, and 
particularly the honor of the family.  Related to family honor are then a myriad of other 
associated issues from the much-lauded Albanian hospitality to the blood feud as the method 
via which infractions on the honor of a family are rectified or assuaged.4   
Copies of the Kanun are widely available.  Indeed, one of the souvenirs available to any tourist 
walking down Mother Theresa Boulevard in Pristina, Kosovo is a large book with a bright red 
cover and the Albanian double eagle on the front.  The Kanun is also widely referenced in 
conversation and culture.  It is, as anthropologist Janet Reinick has noted, “the ultimate 
authority on Albanian tradition" although few have read it (Reineck 1991: 40).  Yet, despite the 
fact that the Kanun exists as a written text, what the Kanun says is not as important as what 
people think it says.  In this way, the Kanun is used as a totem, much in the fashion that the 
constitution is used by some Americans who may refer to their “Constitutional Rights,” but 
never have seriously read or studied the Constitution.  Mustafa and Young note that “People 
deemed knowledgeable about the Kanun receive their training in this complex body of 
                                                     
4 The blood feud also exists in the Pashtunwali, or Afghan tribal law, where honor and revenge are similarly critical 
to the customary code.   
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customary law as an orally transmitted inheritance from the elders without any serious 
engagement with published manuscripts” (Mustafa and Young 2008: 89).  Arsovska (2006) 
compares knowledge about the Kanun to knowledge about the Bible in Western culture where 
certain parables and metaphors are simply known, even to those who don’t read the Bible. This 
type of background knowledge transmitted orally lends itself to a variety of interpretations.   
A lack of engagement with the written text has distanced the general population from the 
specifics of its injunctions.  The content of the codified Kanun is, in some critical aspects, both 
different and less clear, than what people think.  A tragic example of this fact is the gap between 
the written text and the practice of blood feuds.  While the Kanun mandates the taking of blood 
revenge on the perpetrator of a crime or insult to the honor of a family, the contemporary 
understanding in parts of northern Albania is that the revenge can be taken against any of the 
relatives of the perpetrator (Mustafa and Young 2008).  This particular interpretation of the 
Kanun has serious implications as it means that revenge can be taken against minors for offenses 
committed by adult relatives.  In Albanian areas this has meant that families involved in blood 
feuds often hide their children at home, refusing to let them outside at all due to the very real 
fear that the children might be the objects of revenge  ("Albanian blood feud kids must hide or 
risk lives"  2013; Miller 2013).   Both male and female children are sequestered at home, even 
though girls should be exempt from the blood feud according to any interpretation of the text.  
Though the Kanun is given as a justification for the targeting of children in blood feuds, there 
are also strong injunctions in the Kanun against doing so; “Fathers shall not be killed in place of 
their sons, nor sons in place of their fathers, but each shall die for his own sin.” (Fox 1989: 172).   
However, there is ambiguity in the text as this statement is directly followed by the clauses 
below:5 
“According to the old Kanun of the mountains of Albania, only the murderer incurs the blood-
feud, i.e. the person who pulls the trigger and fires the gun or uses some other weapon against 
another person.  The family of the victim could not pursue or kill any of the brothers, nephews, 
or cousins of the murderer, but only the actual perpetrator.  The later Kanun extends the blood-
feud to all males in the family of the murderer, even an infant in the cradle; cousins and close 
nephews, although they may be separated, incur the blood-feud during the 24 hours following 
the murder; after 24 hours the family of the victim must give a guarantee of truce.”   
Since the correct practice of blood feuds takes up a significant portion of the Kanun (a large 
section of The Law Regarding Crimes and smaller portions of other sections), it is somewhat 
surprising that there is a contradiction within the text regarding whether non-perpetrators of a 
                                                     
5 This section is also taken from the English translation by Fox. 
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crime, including innocent children, may be included in the feud.6  One possible explanation is 
that in recording the Kanun, Gjeҫov erred in correctly understanding the custom.  However, the 
weight of evidence suggests otherwise.  Conducting a blood feud correctly is important as the 
avenging of family honor is imperative.   
There are both implicit and specific injunctions against including women in blood feuds.  
Albanian society is patrilineal and women are outside of the line of descent, therefore they 
cannot be involved in the absolution of an offense upon the family honor.  The Kanun also 
makes it absolutely clear that “A woman does not incur blood.”7  However, in the past decade 
women have been killed to atone for family honor.  Recently, a young girl of 17 was killed in 
Northern Albania to avenge a blood feud (Cohen 2012).  In addition to being tragic this case is 
particularly interesting because it demonstrates not only a lack of understanding with regard to 
the appropriate conduct of a blood feud under codified customary law, but also confusion with 
regard to who is part of the lineage.  This interpretation of the text of the Kanun has dreadful 
consequences for the societies in which the customary law still has respect.  Gjin Marku of the 
National Reconciliation Committee in Albania, and NGO that works on resolving blood feuds 
and ameliorating their effects, has observed that "The problem with blood feuds today is that 
people are using their own personal interpretation of the Kanun to suit their needs…. They are 
abusing the laws instead of following the original script, and this is why you see young women 
… becoming targets” (Cohen 2012).   
The use and misuse of the Kanun is a salient public as well as scholarly issue in contexts such as 
Kosovo, Albania and Macedonia where there are large Albanian populations and Albanian 
traditions are highly valued.  Blood feuds are illegal, but often sympathetically viewed, and 
have enormous consequences for the families that are involved.  It is estimated that in Albania  
“20,000 people have been ensnared by blood feuds since they resurfaced after the collapse of 
Communism in 1991, with 9,500 people killed and nearly 1,000 children deprived of schooling 
because they are locked indoors” (Bilefsky 2008).   This is such a significant social issue that the 
Catholic Church announced in 2012 that they would excommunicate anyone involved in a 
                                                     
6 The blood feud is a popular topic for Albanian books and movies from the classic novel Broken April by 
Ismael Kadare to Josh Marston’s 2011 film, The Forgiveness of Blood. 
7 Section XXVIII of the Kanun reads, "A woman does not incur blood." - "A woman transfers blood to her 
parents." It is true that according to our Kanun, "Blood follows the finger" [i.e. the person who commits a 
murder incurs a blood feud], but this law does not include women, since "A woman does not incur 
blood," even if she happens to kill someone. If a woman kills her husband or anyone else, her parents 
incur that blood. Her husband purchases a woman's labor and cohabitation, but not her life.” (Fox 1989)  
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blood feud (Andoni 2012).  There is thus a demonstrated awareness of the significant negative 
impact of aspects of Albanian customary law.8   
It is widely assumed that the weakness of state judicial institutions in northern Albania and 
Kosovo that has led to the increased reliance on the Kanun to address conflicts.  The argument is 
often made that if the state were more efficient in resolving conflicts quickly and fairly, there 
would be no need for people to resort to customary law for dispute resolution.  The resurgence 
of customary law following the collapse of both the Yugoslav and Albanian states lends some 
credence to this argument (Bilefsky 2008; Sikor et al. 2009; Mustafa and Young 2008).   
 
Revisiting Arguments for the Ascertainment of Customary Law 
What should be clear from the above section describing the way the Kanun is used and 
interpreted in contemporary Albanian areas is that writing it down has not had the impact that 
scholars and policy-makers would have predicted.  There is a written text available for 
consultation, but there is very little engagement with the text.  Though there is recognition that 
a correct or contemporary understanding of the Kanun might be of use in ameliorating the 
negative effects of customary law; there are no attempts to reconcile profoundly divergent 
understandings of how blood feuds should be practiced; no Talmudic reflections on meaning 
and application, and interestingly, no attempt to amend or adapt the text to a population that is 
more likely to be Muslim than Catholic.    
Far more influential than the text are individual beliefs of what the text says, typically passed on 
via oral tradition and contemporary practice.  In this regard, Albanian customary law, in spite 
of being formalized in writing, resembles customary law in other settings around the world 
where it is unwritten.  Albanian customary law is open to interpretation and can be applied in 
an inconsistent and at times unpredictable fashion.   
In the second section of this article, three reasons were articulated as justification for the 
ascertainment of customary law.  These reasons were:  to develop a consistency in application; 
to facilitate the alignment of customary and public law; and to increase predictability.  These 
will each be revisited. 
                                                     
8 In Kosovo in the 1990s there was an effort to stop blood feuding led by Professor Anton Çetta and 
supported by large public demonstrations.  Çetta gathered a group of mediators to pacify or bring an end 
to the feuds.  As a result of these efforts there are now fewer blood feuds in Kosovo than in Northern 
Albania. 
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Codification of Albanian traditions in the Kanun has not lead to a consistent contemporary 
application of customary law.  While there are some traditions articulated in the Kanun that are 
widely practiced, such as patrilocality, hospitality and social honor.  Other laws articulated on 
the church, property and livestock are irrelevant to the contemporary culture and quaintly 
anachronistic.  While blood feuds still occur in Albanian areas in the name of tradition, there is 
little attention given to interpreting or updating the customary law that applies to their practice.    
Without an engagement in the interpretation of the text, there is no benefit to the written nature 
of the Kanun.  If people simply believe what they wish about tradition and custom, or interpret 
it based on oral tradition, then Albanian customary law is similar to the role of uncodified 
customary law in other places around the world. 
The second reason given for the ascertaining customary law is to facilitate its alignment or 
incorporation into public law.  The argument is made that a clear articulation of customary law 
is helpful and even necessary to ensuring that both custom and law are respected.  Neither 
Albania nor the Yugoslav successor states of Macedonia and Kosovo have sought to recognize 
Albanian customary law.  Understandings of justice in the public laws of these countries are 
radically different than understandings of justice in the Kanun.9  Both Macedonia and Kosovo 
have been more concerned with making their new states compliant with EU laws in order to 
facilitate their eventual membership.  The Albanian case is very interesting and different.  In 
Albania, under the communist regime of Enver Hoxha, blood killings became criminal offenses 
and there was an effort to stamp out the influence of the Kanun.  However, when the communist 
government collapsed in 1991 there was a resurgence of the influence of the Kanun (Bilefsky 
2008; Sikor et al. 2009; Mustafa and Young 2008).  This resurgence of the use and influence of 
the Kanun also occurred in Kosovo, in the 1990s when other forms of law and governance 
disappeared due to the conflict with Serbia. 
The third reason why a written form of customary law is sought is to increase predictability of 
conflict outcomes, usually with the intent of assuring a more stable environment for economic 
investment and growth.  While the Kanun is widely in use for some areas of Albanian tradition, 
such as marriage and inheritance issues, there are less frequent cases of traditional dispute 
resolution mechanisms being used for cases of theft, land conflicts and boundary demarcation 
(Voell 2003).  It is therefore unclear as to the degree of impact that Albanian customary law has 
on economic growth and development, particularly when compared to parts of the world 
where customary law had a consistent and direct impact on access to resources and intellectual 
property.      
                                                     
9 A point which Sally Engle Merry (2006) notes as characteristic of settings which have legal pluralism – 
each system having different conceptions of what is just.   
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The ready availability of a written text of Albanian customary law has not led to a consistent 
understanding of its rules, a consistent application of its norms; nor a resolution of important 
ambiguities within the text.  Instead, the Kanun serves as a totemic representation of Albanian 
identity, encapsulating what people believe to be traditional without influencing behavior or 
serving as a dynamic articulation of current practices.  It is the existence of the customary law as 
an item, rather than its specific content, which is most important.  Without an engagement with 
the text itself there is unlikely to be a consistent application.   
Conclusion 
Customary law persists despite the existence of public law for a variety of reasons.  Key among 
those reasons are accessibility, speed, cost and, in some settings, preference for the type of 
justice it provides – often reconciliation rather than retribution - and a mechanism for restoring 
offenders to the community and  curbing destructive behavior in the future (Lubkemann et al. 
2011).  Customary law is also dynamic, shifting with changes in culture and context.  Yet, the 
downside of this dynamism is unpredictability in its application and use.  Thus, some scholars 
and policy-makers have called for customary law to be written down in order to reduce 
uncertainty.  An examination of the role of the Albanian Kanun, a customary legal code that has 
been written since the early 20th century, suggests that the expectations that ascertainment will 
lead to consistency and certainty in the application of customary law are overly optimistic.  A 
written record of the Kanun has not lead to its consistent use, and more troubling, it has not lead 
to a clarification of the most socially harmful aspects of the law regarding the practice of blood 
feuds.   
What can we learn from the role of the Kanun in contemporary Albanian communities?  The 
first important conclusion is that writing a tradition down does not make it definitive or 
authoritative.   This observation may reassure some who fear that the ascertainment and 
codification of customary law in contexts like Sub-Saharan Africa would cement in place the 
power dynamics in a community at the particular place and time.  In Sub-Saharan Africa, where 
customary law controls access to critical economic resources such as land, this is a significant 
concern. Yet, whether it is written or not, customary law is still an articulation of tradition and 
tradition changes over time in response to changing contexts.  Formalizing customary law 
through writing is unlikely to change its use unless it is otherwise incorporated into statute or 
public law or recognized by public law in a particular form.  Attendant to this conclusion is an 
observation.  Since customary law is typically transmitted orally and there is rarely an 
engagement with a written code, it should not be entirely surprising to us that there is no 
development of textual interpretation and amendment once the customary law is transcribed.     
Aiming for Certainty/ 16 
 
A second conclusion is that, though there may be disagreement regarding its content, 
customary law is a powerful representation of tradition, a totem of the community.  Customary 
law represents tradition and tradition is valuable to personal understandings of identity 
(Oomen 2005).  Francis Deng has argued that "Every individual relies on other members of the 
family, the lineage, or the clan for his own prospects of being immortalized into a permanent 
identity and influence.  Thus, his group is indispensable to his destiny” (Deng 2011: 295).  As a 
signifier of group identity customary law needs to be treated with care, as with other tangible 
reflections of group identity such as flags and symbols.  Yet, treating it with care does not mean 
accepting it in its entirety.    
The Albanian customary law is a fascinating example of the flourishing of legal pluralism in a 
post-socialist setting.  In spite of substantial efforts to eradicate the traditional practices of the 
Kanun, specifically the blood feuds, but also the inheritance practices and competing customary 
leadership, these have endured.  The post-socialist setting is very different from post-colonial 
areas as customary law was not used as a tool of domination or control.  Indeed, there was little 
use for it at all during the socialist era, yet it survived and when the regimes in Albania and 
Yugoslavia disintegrated, customary law revived as a method of conflict resolution and social 
organization when the state was weak.  As governments in Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia 
become stronger and better able to implement public policy it will be interesting to see what 
role customary law continues to play.  Public policy efforts to channel the use of customary law 
should focus on a dual strategy of respect for a valued tradition while eliminating the morally 
repugnant aspects of customary law.  As I have argued elsewhere “If customary leaders and 
customary law are to remain relevant they must align with constitutional standards of equity 
and citizenship” (Joireman 2011: 68).  
States around the world have adopted a variety of approaches in dealing with customary law.  
Some have recognized it formally in public law, some have recognized its importance in law 
without demanding codification, and in other countries it has no formal recognition at all, but 
continues to function.  While customary law serves as a critical part of the identity of a people 
group, it will continue to hold sway over them.  However, the actions of a state can channel the 
influence of customary law through both prohibitions on its application and promotion of its 
positive aspects, such as the use of respected community leaders as mediators in conflicts.  Yet, 
customary law is not everywhere the same.  Unique histories of colonialism or communist rule 
have influenced its development in a manner often specific to the particular country in which it 
is practiced.  While writing it down can appear to be a formalized ‘fix’ that will allow a state to 
get a handle on the precise nature and impact of customary law, experience demonstrates that 
the nature of customary law as both interpreted tradition and a signifier of identity, resists 
precise definition that would lead to legal certainty.   
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